Browns Ferry Disclosures - Shhh secrets, have the problems been corrected?

TVA photo of Browns Ferry

Shhh, the TVA and the nuclear industry have secrets at Browns Ferry Alabama that they do not want the public to know about. Secrets that jeopardize public safety and health of over 1 million citizens who reside in the plume paths of the three defective GE Mark 1 Browns Ferry Nuclear Reactors.

Art - Nuclear Whistle-Blowers by Pete Ryan

25 identified serious problems at TVA's Browns Ferry Nuclear Reactors. The Browns Ferry 2010 INPO, Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, (Established by the nuclear power industry in December 1979, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations is a not-for-profit organization headquartered in Atlanta. http://www.inpo.info/AboutUs.htm#values ) report discloses that the TVA and the NRC endangered the public. The degraded conditions at TVA's Browns Ferry nuclear facility was much greater than previously released by the TVA or the NRC. The NRC's Red Finding did not disclose the seriousness of TVA's Browns Ferry nuclear facility problems. There is the appearance of a cover-up of serious safety systems and management failures.

INPO Browns Ferry Disclosures, July 2010:
(Item 1, pages 30-31 from Field notes) 1) The TVA and the NRC knew of several valve failures, not just one. Valve failures was an ongoing serious issue in all three Browns Ferry Nuclear Plants since 2006. (Items 2-25 pages 1-17, Executive Summary)
2) Notable gaps in operator fundamentals remain.
3) Weaknesses in the review and recognition of risk associated with some work activities have negatively impacted plant operations.
4) The conduct of maintenance has improved, however, behavior gaps continue to adversely affect safety system performance and cause rework and injuries.
5) Management is not holding key personnel accountable.
6) On-line risk continues to be adversely affected.
7) Chemistry performance has declined, performance gaps are not fully understood. Several unplanned and unmonitored radioactive releases have occurred.
8) Significant gaps in equipment health and component reliability have not been resolved.
9) High-Pressure core injection system experienced multiple failures and are not meeting industry goals.
10) Reactor core cooling system failures attributed to age related degradation.
11) Multiple safety systems failures in the emergency system cooling water and residual heat removal service water.
12) Multiple scrams and transients were the results of long standing equipment problems not corrected, industry goals are not being met.
13) Source of increasing unidentified dry well leakage not identified.
14) Several long standing emergency generator problems have not been resolved.
15) Equipment reliability programs and processes are not being implemented in a manner that will result in a timely resolution to problems, equipment failures or the prevention of new problems.
16) Initiatives to improve equipment reliability are inhibited by supervisors and management.
17) Preventive maintenance is not being implemented to prevent equipment failures.
18) Inadequate consideration for design inputs for plant modifications resulted in multiple scrams.  
19) A significant vulnerability remains with the lack of testing for safety related cables.
20) Industry standards for radiological protection are not being met.
21) A number of organizational and human performance issues exist because personnel were not effective at identifying, properly characterizing, and resolving issues with appropriate corrective actions.
22) Gaps in operational risk assessment, equipment reliability, and human performance remain. As a result, the station is vulnerable in its ability to sustain event-free operations.
23) Workforce behaviors and cultural norms are not aligned with a strong nuclear safety culture.
24) Management acceptance of degraded conditions that challenges safety system reliability.
25) Station is adversely impacted by weaknesses in supervisory and individual behaviors which has the potential to impact future station performance. Workers in several work groups tend to deviate from station standards and station supervisors often do not correct these behaviors.

Have the failures at Browns Ferry been corrected? Have management changes at the TVA improved nuclear safety culture failures? Will the nuclear industry and its regulator continue to cover-up safety issues and problems which jeopardize human health and safety?

Peer Review Reports, regardless of the author, which identify safety conditions which jeopardize public health and safety must be reported to the public.

The placement of the nuclear industry's and nuclear operators financial gain ahead of public safety, health and welfare is immoral, unethical and in the case of degraded nuclear safety systems, including human factors, probably illegal.

There is a later Peer Review report by the World Association of Nuclear Operators, WANO, concerning Browns Ferry. WANO is also a non-profit organization. http://www.wano.info/about-us/
I have requested inspection of the report from the TVA, below is their reply.

TVA claims that the inspection of this report by me would harm TVA's future participation in WANO. I did not request a copy of the report, I requested permission to inspect the report.

The denial also states that the WANO report contains proprietary methodology and would harm WANO's competitive financial position in the nuclear power industry. WANO is a non-profit organization.

SUMMARY:
INPO and WANO's work is copyright protected. However, U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Rule: "Section 107 contains a list of the various purposes for which the reproduction of a particular work may be considered fair, such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, nonprofit educational purposes and research. Link: http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html

No organization may keep work practices secret which creates a danger to the public at large.  Proprietary information, restricted commercial/financial information and copyright restrictions are bogus red herring arguments which are unsupportable excuses to not inform the public about serious management and safety culture failures at a nuclear power facility.

We are not speaking about the failure of a valve in one safety system as the NRC and TVA would like the public to believe. We are speaking about the intentional cover-up of multiple unsafe operations as a result of failed management and a failed safety culture at a nuclear power plant. How does the public know the serious deficiencies described in the INPO report have been corrected?

The recent NRC 95003 Red Finding at Browns Ferry involved a valve problem, not the complete breakdown of TVA management at Browns Ferry, which the INPO report vividly describes.

Maybe the NRC, TVA, INPO, WANO and others should "practice what they preach" as it applies to law and policy. NRC Safety Culture Policy Statement - http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/safety-culture/sc-policy-statement.html

TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - The continuing Saga: When did the NRC and the TVA Know about the Defective Valves and Management Failures? Did the NRC Intentionally Deceive the Public

 

When and how long had the Tennessee Valley Authority's, TVA, Browns Ferry been experiencing degraded conditions as a result of failed valves? Was there an intentional cover-up by the TVA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC? Do nuclear Peer Review organizations such as WANO, World Association of Nuclear Operators, or INPO, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, have a moral, ethical and legal responsibility to disclose the existence of serious issues which may jeopardize public health and welfare of the public relating to nuclear power operations?

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) 

BRIEFING ON BROWNS FERRY UNIT 1

OCTOBER 18, 2011

9:O0 A.M.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Public Meeting

Link: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20111018.pdf

 

All the players were present, the NRC Commissioners and TVA Senior Executives. Quote from page 1 of the report -

"CHAIRMAN JACZKO: Good morning, everyone. The Commission meets today to discuss the safety challenges experienced by the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant and the steps being taken to strengthen safety at the plant.  In particular, in May 2004, Brown's Ferry Unit 1 was placed in Column IV of the  Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix after it received a "Red" finding when a  reactor core cooling valve failed." Is that an error?

 

In the next paragraph Commissioner Jaczko goes on to say:

"This is not the only significant issue the Browns Ferry plant has experienced in recent years. In 2003, all units at Browns Ferry were placed in Column III after receiving a "Yellow" finding for fire protection issues. Given this recent history of issues, I'm sure that we can all agree that we want to see the plant perform more safely. To achieve that, there needs to be a strong commitment from the licensee’s entire organization, from its senior leadership to its frontline engineers to do what needs to be done for safety."

 

Had the plant actually received "Red finding" in 2004, or was this an error on the part of the NRC Chairman, Commissioner Jaczko? Attention to detail is important for the nuclear industry. The report continues; BILL BORCHARDT's comments on page 4 of the PDF linked: "...Browns Ferry Unit 1 entered Column IV of the Action Matrix in the fourth quarter of 2010." VICTOR MCCREE's comments on page 5: "...Unit 1 was assessed as being in the multiple repetitive degraded cornerstone, or Column IV, of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix. Unit 1 was placed in this cornerstone column due to a "Red" finding in the mitigating systems cornerstone...On October 23rd, 2010, operators of Browns Ferry Unit 1 attempted to place Loop II of the residual heat removal low pressure coolant injection, or, RHR LPCI system in service to support refueling activities."

 

Maybe Commissioner Jaczko misspoke about the 2004 "Red Finding. Meanwhile, according to the NRC, the "Red Finding" is lifted and Browns Ferry Unit 1 is returned to the "Green" operating column stating, "The results of the inspection indicated that Browns Ferry was being operated safely." NUCPRO's listing of the Browns Ferry Assessment Letter: March 10, 2014 http://www.nucpros.com/content/browns-ferry-annual-assessment-letter

 

When did TVA and the NRC know there were valve problems at Browns Ferry?

Nuclear facilities have the privilege of receiving Peer Review Inspections by two separate groups of nuclear engineers. One of the groups is WANO, World Association of Nuclear Operators. Another group is INPO, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Unfortunately for the public, when the INPO or WANO reports are issued  they have a statement that they are restricted from public view.  The TVA claims that the public is not entitled to see the reports nor entitled to a copy of the report for proprietary and financial reasons. TVA's position is highly suspect and reflective of TVA's attempt to continue with cover-ups and secrecy involving its nuclear program failures. However, the WANO and INPO groups themselves mark the reports as restricted.

 

The restrictive markings, when covering up serious safety issues which reflect negligent actions on the part of management of nuclear power plants, are effectively covering up issues which are of grave public concern. In the case of the Browns Ferry GE Mark 1 Nuclear plants the issues covered up, if not corrected, place the public at a higher risk of physical injury as a result of TVA negligence and a failure to correct the negligent actions by the regulator, the NRC.  

 

The WANO and INPO reports contain information that should be and must be made public. There is an ethical, moral and legal responsibility of the government agencies and the professional nuclear engineering organizations to make public those defective items identified which may in fact cause a catastrophic failure thus endangering the public. Such is the case of multiple defective valves which insure a nuclear reactor is cooled properly in the course of normal operations and emergency events.

 

The reports contain information regarding the safety of operating nuclear reactors. In the case of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Facility the INPO report dated July 2010 indicates the TVA, and presumably the NRC knew of the repetitive valve failures at all of the 3 Browns Ferry Units going back to 2006. On pages 30 and 31 (of 83pages) all 3 Browns Ferry Units experienced various valve failures.

The following photo of the pages are hereby listed as news, criticism and educational use, this posting is a not for profit listing under the Fair Use Rule of Section 107 of United States Law.

 

This listing also casts grave doubt on the inappropriate classification of such documents and the Federal Government's and the INPO/WANO institutions responsibilities to divulge such information to the public. The INPO report discloses long time safety failures at Browns Ferry and brings to light the regulators failure, NRC, as well as the TVA's failure as to safety culture and executive management. This failure extends to the NRC having access to such reports and keeping the reports restricted. The restriction of the reports are immoral, unethical, and possibly illegal, as they disclose serious public safety hazards regarding nuclear reactors at the TVA Browns Ferry nuclear facility. 

 

Nuclear Power Plant Safety and the protection of the publics health and welfare should be a TEAM PROCESS to protect the public. Not a process of cover-ups and secret documents to protect the nuclear power industry, executives, defective systems and incompetent managers. 

 

The INPO report began its description as Follows for the defective valves at Browns Ferry on page 28: "High and Low Pressure Injection systems have experienced repeat and age related failures." It goes on to describe management failures and "insufficient actions to prevent reoccurrence of equipment failures." The exact findings are hereby submitted as a "Fair Use Right" for the purpose of news reporting, education, criticism and the exposure of systemic negligence in a safety culture involving nuclear power use by the TVA.

 

Click on images for an expanded view.

 

 

Due to the seriousness of the issues involved and the appearance of a cover-up and or negligent activities on the part of the NRC and the TVA in this matter, the INPO report relating to valve failures at the TVA Browns Ferry GE Mark 1 Nuclear Facility is disclosed.

 

The July 2010 INPO report goes on to describe other equipment failures as a result of a failed safety culture and management neglect.

 

Nuclear Engineer Henry Jones discusses the existence of Peer Review Reports and their implications.

NRC Regulatory Performance Report on the 3 TVA GE Mark 1 Nuclear Reactors at Browns Ferry Alabama, Video Report in 4 Parts, January 30, 2014

World Association of Nuclear Operators, WANO Browns Ferry Risk Assessment Report, Jan. 29, 2013 quote from Mr. Jones: "...Warned, a combination of human performance and safety systems weaknesses results in a high potential for a significant plant event."

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 'red finding' removed, but plant still under intensive inspection status. http://blog.al.com/breaking/2014/01/tva.html  "Federal regulators have removed a critical "red" finding from TVA's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, but the plant remains in a state of heightened inspections due to other problems...The announcement that Browns Ferry had completed work related to the 2011 red finding that identified a significant safety problem, was made during a public meeting hosted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Athens,[ Al.]" on January 30, 2014.

NRC Regulatory Performance Meeting regarding the 3 TVA Browns Ferry GE Mark 1 nuclear reactors. This is Part 1, NRC and TVA input.

Part 2, Citizen Comments


Part 3, Citizen Comments

Browns Ferry 95003 (Red Flag) NRC Inspection Public Meeting Exit Briefing - July 11, 2013

TVA photo of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant containing 3 GE Mark 1 defective nuclear reactors and their millions of pounds of spent highly radioactive, used, nuclear fuel. (Updated Jul 26, 2013, end of this article)

 

BACKGROUND

During an October 2010 refueling it was discovered that a safety valve had been non-functioning or failed sometime after March 2009, but the failure was not identified nor corrected until the October 2010 fueling outage. This lead the NRC to place Browns Ferry in the degraded category 4 status, a Red Finding. The worse operational status the nuclear plant could receive and remain open.

http://blog.al.com/huntsville-times-business/2011/05/browns_ferry_nuclear_plant_cit.html

and http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011/may/10/nrc-valve-failure-browns-ferry-high-safety-signifi/

 

Several managers were replaced and serious leadership failures were identified. Unfortunately, the failure to identify problems and correct them is not a reason to close a nuclear plant. Once again, the citizens of North Alabama are lucky that a nuclear accident did not occur during the time the critical safety systems were inoperable.

 

95003 Inspection-Red Finding Public Exit Briefing and Public Input

In February of this year the TVA requested the NRC to begin their final 95003 Inspection Process.

http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2013/feb/15/browns-ferry-ready-for-inspection/ 

  

At the end of the Red Finding inspection process, called a 95003 Inspection process, a TVA Engineer comes forward during the public input session and states that current management have "modified"  corrective action and safety reports.

 

The Engineer is Ms. Joni Johnson, a TVA root cause analyst engineer. She claims there continues to be a flawed safety culture and indicates leadership, including the NRC, is covering up the extent of the deficiencies. http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/07/browns_ferry_engineer_never_ex.html

"Shrinking the Safety Margin:"  http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/07/browns_ferry.html 

 

Ms. Johnson's presentation to the NRC at the Public Exit Session: 

NRC answers technical questions about Ms. Johnson's complaints and presentation placed forward by Mr. Don Safer, one of several concerned citizens who spoke at the NRC 95003 Public Exit Session.




The Red Finding remains and there are further questions about other safety violations which the NRC refused to make comment about when asked to specifically identify the mentioned violation and pending enforcement action. Questions by BREDL/BEST/MATRR member Garry Morgan to NRC Region 2 Administrator Victor McCree. Red Finding continues: http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/07/browns_ferry_stuck_with_red_wa.html and  http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2013/jul/11/nrc-tvas-browns-ferry-nuclear-plant-still-needs-im/



Videos of the Browns Ferry Annual Assessment and the NRC 95003 Public Exit Inspection Briefing at Calhoun College on July 11, 2013.

NRC Presentation
>NRC Browns Ferry 2012 Annual Assessment Report - July 11, 2013
>Browns Ferry 95003 (Red) NRC Exit Meeting Part 1 Jul 11, 2013
>Browns Ferry 95003 (Red) NRC Exit Meeting Part 2 07-11-13
>Browns Ferry 95003 (Red) NRC Exit Meeting Part-3 07-11-13
>Browns Ferry NRC 95003 (Red) Exit Summary Part-4 07-11-13

Public Input
> Browns Ferry NRC Inspection TVA Engineer Questions NRC 7 11 13
>Browns Ferry 95003 NRC Public Q&A Part1 Fire Safety 7-11-13 (Stewart Horn)
>Browns Ferry 95003 NRC-Exit-The Whistleblower 7-11-13 Pt-2  (Don Safer)
>Browns Ferry 95003 NRC Public Q&A Part 3, 7-11-13 (Gretel Johnston)
>Browns Ferry 95003 NRC-Public Q&A Part-4 7-11-13  (Garry Morgan)
   
UPDATE: "al.com July 26, 2013 - "TVA, regulators debate safety significance of emergency shutdown at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant  - Unit 2 was running at 100 percent power on Dec. 22, 2012 when a TVA senior reactor operator opened the wrong breaker on a reactor protection system bus. That caused the reactor to shut down and "also caused the main steam isolation valves to close. The main steam isolation valves are designed to close in the unlikely event of a rupture in the plant's steam pipes," according to the NRC."    http://blog.al.com/breaking/2013/07/post_1210.html

Radioactive Emissions and Health Hazards Surrounding Browns ... Ferry